Free-Trade Areas and Contingent Protection between Competing Exporters by Belayneh Kassa Anagaw & Tabakis, Chrysostomos
KDI SCHOOL 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
KDI SCHOOL WORKING PAPER SERIES 
Free-Trade Areas and Contingent Protection 
between Competing Exporters
Belayneh Kassa Anagaw
KDI School of Public Policy and Management
Chrysostomos Tabakis
KDI School of Public Policy and Management
December, 2018
Working Paper  18-13
This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
KDI School of Public Policy and Management Working Paper Series Index:
http://www.kdischool.ac.kr/new/eng/faculty/working.jsp
The Social Science Network Electronic Paper Collection:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3325679
Free-Trade Areas and Contingent Protection
between Competing Exporters
Belayneh Kassa Anagaw and Chrysostomos Tabakis
December 6, 2018
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of free-trade areas (FTAs) on the use
of contingent protection between competing exporters. We develop a dy-
namic model similar to the competing-importers one of Tabakis (2015), in
which countries are limited to self-enforcing cooperative multilateral trade
agreements and the economic environment is characterized by trade-flow
volatility. Our analysis demonstrates that the findings of Tabakis (2015)
extend to our competing-exporters case. In particular, the parallel forma-
tion of different FTAs results in a gradual but permanent easing ofmultilat-
eral trade tensions, especially as far as contingent protection is concerned.
Thus, our results highlight a building-block effect of FTAs on multilateral
trade cooperation.
1
1 Introduction
There is an ongoing theoretical debate among economists about the impact of
RTAs on the realization of multilateral trade liberalization. The first group of
economists argues that RTAs can be a building block towards multilateral trade
liberalization. While others argue RTAs ar a stumbling block for multilateral
cooperation.
For example, Summers et al. (1991) emphasizes the positive role of RTAs on the
facilitation of multilateral trade negotiations. Similarly, Ornelas (2012) by using
an oligopolistic-political-economy model highlights the role played by FTAs in
reducing obstacles to multilateral trade liberalization, thus emerging as a build-
ing block towards global free trade.
On the other hand, there is a theoretical justification where RTAs can be
a stumbling block for multilateral negotiations due to the possibility that such
agreements can generate static welfare gains. Under such circumstances, RTAs
will reduce the incentives to extend trade liberalization. In his ”dynamic path
model” Krugman (1993), shows how regionalism affects multilateralism.
The other theoretical paper by Krishna (1998) shows that RTAs create disin-
centives for multilateral trade liberalization. Using a model of imperfect compe-
tition in different segmentedmarkets, Krishna posits two conclusions: RTAs that
result in trade diversion are more likely to be supported politically and hence,
such RTAs will reduce incentives for multilateral liberalization. Aghion, Antràs,
and Helpman (2007) developed a dynamic bargaining model and show the pos-
sibilities of stumbling block and building blocks effects of Free Trade Areas
(FTAs) on Multilateral cooperation.1
Bagwell and Staiger (1997) model the implication of customs union forma-
tion on multilateral tariff cooperation and shows that the early formation of cus-
toms unions can lead to a temporary easing of multilateral trade tensions at the
1see Bhagwati (1993) for further elaboration in this issues.
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early stages of their formation. But once the process of customs unions is com-
pleted, the market–power effect becomes real and there will be an incentive to
deviate to a higher tariff. The intuition is that the formation of customs unions
gives rise to trade–diversion effect and a market power effect. Thus, their model
shows the importance of the market power effect relative to the trade diversion
effect that ultimately results in the prediction that the positive impact of cus-
tom union formation is just temporary which will have a negative consequence
on multilateral tariff cooperation once the process of custom union formation is
completed.
In a similar work Bagwell and Staiger (1997) model the consequence of the
formation of RTAs on the ability to maintain effective multilateral cooperation.
Their model predicts that from the start to the negotiation of the RTAs, the im-
pact on the ability of multilateral cooperation is negative. However, their model
suggests that the negative impact on multilateral tariff cooperation is temporary.
Once RTA formation process is completed, country’s ability to multilaterally
cooperate is restored.
2 The Model
We assume four-country, four-good world where each importing country has
three countries competing to export a specific good. Suppose the four countries
are X, Y,W and Z, and the associated goods that are produced and exchanged in
the international market are x, y, w and z. At any period, country i’s endowment
of good i and j are 1-e and 1+ e
3
respectively, where j and i ∈ (x, y, w, z), i ̸= j,
and the variable e, whichwe use to capture trade-flow volatility is a random num-
ber which is drawn independently from a uniform distribution on [0,1]. Country
I is the only importer of good i for I ∈ (X,Y,W,Z). On the consumption side,
we assume all countries face symmetric demand functions where the demand for
product i in country J, where J ∈ (X,Y,W,Z), is given by C(P ji ) = α− βP ji ,
3
where the constant β is positive, α > 4
3
, P Ji is the price of good i in country
J. Our model follows from Tabakis (2015) which uses the competing importers
model instead.
As in Tabakis (2015), in this model we assume there exists two trading blocs;
country X and Y form an FTA on one side and W and Z form another FTA.
Country i imports good i from country j, hence country i’s import of good i from
j is equal to country j’ s export of good i. Thus, country i’s import demand for
good i from country j is given by (1 + e
3
)−C(P ji ), which is exactly country j’s
export of good i. And we keep assuming each country’s economic environment
is characterized by the volatility of trade flows at every period that is a function
of e as in Tabakis (2015).
Finally, following Tabakis (2015) and Bagwell and Staiger (1997), we as-
sume the world goes through three phases: Phase I with no FTAs between coun-
tries, but with possibility of future FTAs negotiation between prospective coun-
try pairs; Phase II where trade negotiations are held between X and Y in the
one hand,and W and Z in the other hand; finally phase III, where two symmetric
FTAs are in place in the world. Moreover, each country follows the MFN princi-
ple for non-discrimination. In addition, we assume also that if FTA negotiations
have not yet started, there is the possibility that the FTA negotiations between X
and Y on the one hand and W and Z i in the other hand will start in next period
with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, we assume that if the trade talks have started
at time t between country pairs, they will be concluded and be in effect at t+1
with probability λ ∈ [0, 1].
3 Phase III
In Phase III, X and Y form one FTA, while W and Z form another one. Thus,
our analysis begins with such a symmetric world.
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3.1 Phase–III static game
The non-arbitrage condition yields for good x (similarly for the rest of the good):
PXx = P
Y
x = P
W
x + τ
X = PZx + τ
X (1)
PXx refers to the price of product x in country X and τX and τW is the import tariff
of country X. The market clearing price for good i requires the world demand to
be equal to the world supply.
1− e+ 3(1 + e
3
) = CXX + C
Y
X + C
W
X + C
Z
X
= 4α− 4βPXX + β
(
τX + τX
)
PXX =
4α− 4 + 2βτX
4β
=
α− 1
β
+
τX
2
= P YX (2)
Therefore:
PWX =
α− 1
β
− τ
X
2
(3)
In our case country X imports good x from three countries: Y, W and Z. But
the tariff against country Y is zero due to the FTA. We assume that the tariff that
is chosen by each country is non-negative and non-prohibitive. Thus, the price
set for a give product has the following arbitrage condition.
Country X’s import function is thus expressed as:
MXW = (1 +
e
3
)− (α− β (PWX )) = e3 − βτX2 (4)
A similar relationship holds for X’s import function from Z.
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Therefore, country X’s welfare is defined as the sum of the surplus received from
the consumption of four goods, the surplus received from the production of the
four goods and the tariff revenue from imports of X from country W and Z:
WX3 =
∫ α/β
PXX
C (P ) dP +
∫ α/β
PXY
C (P ) dP +
∫ α/β
PXW
C (P ) dP +
∫ α/β
PXZ
C (P ) dP
+
∫ PXX
0
(1− e) dP +
∫ PXY
0
(
1 +
e
3
)
dP +
∫ PXW
0
(
1 +
e
3
)
dP +
∫ PXZ
0
(
1 +
e
3
)
dP
+τXMXW + τ
XMXZ (5)
Using equation (5), we can derive the optimal tariff for country X:
∂WX3
∂τX
=
e
6
− 7
4
βτX (6)
This implies thatWX3 is strictly concave in τX and the best response tariff for X
equal:
τNX =
2e
21β
(7)
Since country X and country Y face similar situation they have the same
Nash tariff. That is the Nash tariff for country Y equal:
τNY =
2e
21β
(8)
Note that the global efficient tariff is zero since ∂W3(e,τ⃗)
∂τ
= −2βτ implying that
the Nash tariff choosen by each country is not efficient. Hence countries can
become better off if they cooperatively choose their tariffs. To give an intuitive
explanation, a tariff by a given country worsens the exporting countries’ terms
of trade and hence welfare. Though the importing country is better off in terms
of generating tariff revenue, its welfare will be negatively affected by the tariffs
6
it faces against its exports. The implication is that our static game features of the
Prisoners dilemma property. Hence, countries can do better if they cooperate.
3.2 Phase–III dynamic game
Now we consider a dynamic where countries engage in a repetition of the static
game analysed above. We assume at the start of the period, countries are in-
formed about the current trade shock and its implications for inter-bloc trade vol-
ume. Then they simultaneously choose their current period tariff. When coun-
tries choose their current period tariff, the chosen tariff must be self-enforcing.
More precisely, for a given value of e, a one-time deviation from the cooperative
tariff must not exceed the discounted future benefit of cooperation. To develop
it mathematically gain from one time deviation given by:
Ω3(τ
N
x , τ
c
x, τ
c
−x) ≡ WX3 (τNx , τ c−x)−WX3 (τ cx, τ c−x) (9)
dΩ3(e, τ
N
x , τ
c
x, τ
c
−x)
de
=
∂W x3 (e, τ
N
x , τ
c
x, τ
c
−x)
∂e
− ∂W
x
3 (e, τ
c
x, τ
c
x, τ
c
−x)
∂e
=
1
6
[τNx − τ cx] (10)
dΩ3(e, τ
N
x , τ
C
x , τ
c
−x)
dτ cx
=
∂W x3 (e, τ
N
x , τ
c
x, τ
c
−x)
∂τ c−x
− ∂W
x
3 (e, τ
c
x, τ
c
x, τ
c
x)
∂τ cx
= −[1
6
τNx −
7β
4
τ cx] (11)
Using the Envelope theorem, dΩ3(e,τ
N
x ,τ
c
x,τ
c
−x)
de
> 0 and dΩ3(e,τ
N
x ,τ
c
x,τ
c
−x)
dτcx
< 0
if and only if τCx < 2e21β = τ
N
x . In other words, if the cooperative tariff is set
to the Nash tariff, there is no incentive to cheat. In general the static gain from
defection is given by :
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Ω3(τ
N
x , τ
c
x, τ
c
−x) =
7b
8
[(τ cx)
2 − (τNx )2] +
e
6
[τNx − τ cx] (12)
However, any temptation to cheat has the risk of future trade war due to grim-
trigger strategy employed by all countries. Thus, when countries attempt to devi-
ate from the cooperative tariff, they compare the static gain from defection with
the future discounted value of cooperation. Suppose all countries value the fu-
ture equally and let each country’s discount factor between periods be δ ∈ [0, 1)
and E be the expectations operator with expectations taken over the distribu-
tion of e. Then the present discounted value of the expected future gains from
multilateral cooperation today is given as:
δ
1− δ [EW
x(e, τCx , τ
C
−x)− EW x(e, τNx , τN−x)]
≡ ω3(τ c3(.)) (13)
Thus, from the equation (9) and (13), the countries no defect condition at the
phase–III is given by:
Ω3(e, τ
c
x(e), τ
c
x(e, τ
c
y(e), τ
c
z (e) ≤ ω3(e, τ cx(e), τ cx(e, τ cw(e), τ cz (e)),∀e (14)
But on equation (13) illustrates ω3 itself depends on the cooperative tariff func-
tion selected by countries. Therefore we need to make sure that equation (13)
and (14) are consistent. To do this our interest lies on finding the most coop-
erative tariff function chosen by the four countries. Hence, we the approach of
Tabakis (2015) and Bagwell and Staiger (1988), we initially fix ω3 at an arbitrary
non-negative value ,ω¯3, and solve the smallest possible non negative cooperative
tariff (τ c3 ) as well as the threshold volume of trade(e¯3).
Thus, fixing ω¯3 > 0 and solving for e¯3:
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ω ≡ WX(e¯1, τNX (e¯), 0)−WX(e¯, 0, 0) =
e2
126β
e¯1 =
√
126βω (15)
The value on equation (15)is the threshold volume of trade where free trade
trade can maintained. Thus, the most cooperative tariff for country X can be
found by solving the following equation :
ω = WX
(
e, τNX , τ
c
−x
) − WX (e, τ cx, τ c−x) (16)
Solving for τ cX ,
τ cx =
2
[
e−√126βω]
21β
=
2 [e− e¯]
21β
(17)
Putting all together, we can summarize our findings in Lemma 1 .
Lemma 1:
F (y) = 2y
3
2 − 6y + 6y 12 (18)
τˆ cx(e) =
 0 if e ∈ [0, e¯3];2(e−e¯)
21β
if e ∈ (e¯3, 1].
(19)
Where: e¯3 =
√
126βωIII
and with ωIII ∈ (0, 1
126β
) being the unique interior fixed point of:
ω˜III(ω¯3) =

δ
1−δ
F (126βω¯)
1323β
if ω¯3 ∈ [0, 1126β ];
δ
1−δ
2
1323β
if ω¯3 > 1126β .
(20)
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The implication of lemma 1 is that free trade can be sustained between coun-
tries if the inter-bloc trade volume is low. For low inter-bloc volume of trade,
the incentive to defect is small. But as along as the trade volume between blocs
increases and sufficiently greater than the threshold volume of trade, e¯3 , there
will be greater incentive to deviate frommultilateral cooperation and hence, free
trade couldn’t be an option. As a result, countries may apply special protection
such as safeguards or countervailing duties so that the incentive to deviate from
the cooperative tariff would is kept check. Figure 1 depicts the most cooperative
tariff as a function of volume of trade, e.
Figure 1: Tariff function in Phase III
4 Phase II
Phase II is the transition period where there are two parallel trade talks between
the country pairs.
4.1 Phase–II static game
In phase II, we can characterize the Nash equilibrium by looking at country X ,
due to the fact that all countries face a symmetric situation. Hence, the market–
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clearing price for good X is detrmined where by having that world supply equals
world demand for good x.
P xx =
α− 1
β
+
3τx
4
(21)
P−xx =
α− 1
β
− τ
x
4
(22)
Country X’s imports from J, where J ∈ (Y,W,Z) are equal to country J’s
total export of good X. Thus, imports are given by:
Mxj = (1 +
e
3
)− (α− βP jx) =
e
3
− βτ
x
4
(23)
Now define the welfare of X as the sum of consumer surplus, Producer sur-
plus and tariff revenue.
WX2 =
∫ α/β
PXX
C (P ) dP +
∫ α/β
PXY
C (P ) dP +
∫ α/β
PXW
C (P ) dP +
∫ α/β
PXZ
C (P ) dP
+
∫ PXX
0
(1− e) dP +
∫ PXY
0
(
1 +
e
3
)
dP +
∫ PXW
0
(
1 +
e
3
)
dP +
∫ PXZ
0
(
1 +
e
3
)
dP
τXMXY + τ
XMXW + τ
XMXZ . (24)
Using equation (24), we can derive the optimal tariff for country X:
∂WX2
∂τX
=
e
4
− 15
16
βτX (25)
This implies that WX2 is strictly concave in τX and the Nash tariff for X
equal:
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τNX =
4e
15β
(26)
Note that the Nash tariff in phase III is less than the phase–II Nash tariff
of 4e
15β
implying that once, FTAs are formed between countries, each country
reduces the external tariffs against non-members. This is of course inline with
past literature about the existence of tariff complementarity effect.
4.2 Phase–II dynamic game
Now we turn to characterize the phase II dynamic game: Doing so, we first look
at the most cooperative tariff function that can be supported during the time
where trade negotiation is underway which we call it the transition phase. The
most cooperative tariff that is self-enforcing is relative to the static gain from
defecting from cooperative tariff.
The static gain from defection is given by :
Ω2(τ
N
x , τ
C
x , τ
C
−x) = W
x
2 (τ
N
x , τ
C
−x)−W x2 (τCx , τC−x)
=
15β
32
[(τCx )
2 − (τNx )2] +
e
4
[τNx − τCx ] (27)
Thus;
dΩ2(e, τ
N
x , τ
C
x , τ
c
−x)
de
=
∂W x2 (e, τ
N
x , τ
C
x , τ
c
−x)
∂e
− ∂W
x
2 (e, τ
c
x, τ
C
x , τ
c
−x)
∂e
=
1
4
[τNx − τ cx]
(28)
dΩ2(e, τ
N
x , τ
c
x, τ
c
−x)
dτ cx
=
∂W x2 (e, τ
N
x , τ
C
x , τ
C
−x)
∂τ c−x
− ∂W
x
2 (e, τ
c
x, τ
C
x , τ
C
x )
∂τCx
= −[1
4
τNx −
7β
4
τ cx]
(29)
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Using the envelope theorem, dΩ(e,τ
N
x ,τ
C
x ,τ
C
−x)
de
> 0 and dΩ(e,τ
N
x ,τ
C
x ,τ
C
−x)
dτCx
< 0,
which is true if and only if τCx < 4e15β = τ
N
x . In other words if the cooperative
tariff is set to the Nash tariff, there is no incentive to cheat.
The discounted expected future welfare loss for a country that violates mul-
tilateral cooperation today is given by:
ω2 =
(1− λ)δ
1− (1− λ)δ [EW2(e, τ
c
x, τ
c
−x)− EW2(e, τNx , τN−x)] +
λ
1− (1− λ)δω
III
ω2 =
(1− λ)δ
1− (1− λ)δ
[
2
75β
(
var (e) + (E (e))2
)− 3β
8
(
var (τ c) + (E (τ c))2
)]
+
λωIII
1− (1− λ)
(30)
We first fix ω2 at an arbitrary non-negative value and solve for the smallest
possible non negative cooperative tariff as well as the threshold volume of trade.
Thus, the most cooperative function is given by:
τˆ cx(e) =
 0 if e ∈ [0, e¯2];4(e−e¯2)
15β
if e ∈ (e¯2, 1].
(31)
We have that:
ω˜II(ωII) =
(1− λ) δ
1− (1− λ) δ

[
2
(√
30β ω
)3 − 180βω + 6√30βω]
225β
+ λ
1− (1− λ) δω
III
(32)
Define a function :
F (y) = 2y
3
2 − 6y + 6y 12
ω˜II(ωII) = (1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
F(30βωII)
225β
+ λ
1−(1−λ)δω
III
ω˜
′II(ωII) = (1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
30F(30βωII)
225β
> 0 iff 30βωII ̸= 1 =⇒ ωII ̸= 1
30
13
ω˜
′II(0) =∞
ω˜
′II( 1
30β
) = (1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
30F (1)
225β
= 0
ω˜
′′II(ω) = (1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
900F(30βωII)
225β
< 0 iff 30β < 1 =⇒ ωII < 1
30β
Therefore, the neccessary and sufficient condition for a unique fixed point
ωII ∈ (0, 1
30β
) is ω˜II( 1
30β
) < 1
30β
Lemma 2 The proofs are discussed above:
The most cooperative tariff in Phase II is
τˆ c(e) =
 0 if e ∈ [0, e¯2];4(e−e¯2)
15β
if e ∈ (e¯2, 1].
(33)
Where e¯2 =
√
30βωII
and
With ωII ∈ (0, 1
30β
) being the unique fixed point of:
ω˜II(ω¯) =

(1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
F (30βω¯)
225β
+ λ
1−(1−λ)δω
III if ω¯II ∈ [0, 1
30β
];
(1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
2
225β
+ λ
1−(1−λ)δω
III if ω¯II > 1
30β
.
(34)
Having all these most cooperative tariffs, we compare ωII and ωIII
Lemma 3: ωII < ωIII . The proof for this is in the appendix:
The implication of Lemma 3 has the following corollary:
Corollary 1: e¯II < e¯III
Using equation (19) and (33), we have the following proposition
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Proposition 1: τˆ c2(e) = τˆ c3(e) = 0 for e ∈ [0, e¯2]; and τˆ c2(e) > τˆ c3(e) for
e ∈ [e¯2, 1].
An important observation of phase II is that, the threshold volume of inter-bloc
tradewhere free trade can bemaintained is lower in phase II than phase III imply-
ing that protection measures are more frequent and higher as compared to phase
III. Figure 2, shows the phase II and III most cooperative tariffs as a function of
trade volume.
Figure 2: Most cooperative tariff function in phase II and phase III
15
5 Phase I
Phase I is a period where countries trade normally but expect that trade nego-
tiations will start soon between them. Here the phase I static game outcome is
similar with that of phase II. Where the static Nash- tariff is :τNj = 4e15β where
j=X,Y,W, and Z
5.1 Phase–I dynamic game
Now we turn to analyze the most cooperative tariff that can be supported during
the pre-negotiation period. We start by analyzing the static incentive to cheat
from the most cooperative tariff. Welfare gain from cheating from the most
cooperative tariff equal:
Ω(τNx , τ
C
x , τ
C
−x) = W
x(τNx , τ
C
−x)−W x(τCx , τC−x)
=
15β
32
[(τCx )
2 − (τNx )2] +
e
4
[τNx − τCx ] (35)
dΩ(e, τNx , τ
C
x , τ
C
−x)
de
=
∂W x(e, τNx , τ
C
x , τ
C
−x)
∂e
− ∂W
x(e, τ cx, τ
C
x , τ
C
−x)
∂e
=
1
4
[τNx − τC−x] (36)
∂Ω(e, τNx , τ
C
x , τ
C
−x)
∂τCx
=
∂W x(e, τNx , τ
C
x , τ
C
−x)
∂τC−x
− ∂W
x(e, τ cx, τ
C
x , τ
C
x )
∂τCx
= −[1
4
τNx −
7β
4
τCx ] (37)
Using the envelope theorem, dΩ(e,τ
N
x ,τ
C
x ,τ
C
−x)
de
> 0 and ∂Ω(e,τ
N
x ,τ
C
x ,τ
C
−x)
∂τCx
< 0, which
is true if and only if τCx < 4e15β = τ
N
x . In other words if the cooperative tariff is
set to the Nash tariff, there is no incentive to cheat.
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The discounted expected future welfare loss for a country that violates the
multilateral cooperation today is given by:
ω1 =
(1− ρ) δ
1− (1− ρ) δ
[
EW
(
e, τ cx, τ
c
−x
)− EW (e, τNx , τN−x)]
+
ρ
1− (1− ρ) δ
ωII − λω1III
1− λ (38)
Finally,
ω1 =
(1− λ)δ
1− (1− λ)δ
[
2
75β
(
var (e) + (E (e))2
)− 3β
8
(
var (τ c) + (E (τ c))2
)]
+
ρ
1− (1− ρ) δ
ωII − λωIII
1− λ
=
(1− ρ) δ
1− (1− ρ) δE
[
−225β2 (τ cx)2 + 16e2
600β
]
+
ρ
1− (1− ρ) δ
ωII − λωIII
1− λ .
(39)
Lemma 4: The most Cooperative tariff function in Phase I equal:
τˆ c(e) =
 0 if e ∈ [0, e¯1];4(e−e¯)
15β
if e ∈ (e¯, 1].
(40)
Where e¯1 =
√
30βωI and
with ωI ∈ (0, 1
30β
) being the unique fixed point of:
ω˜I(ω¯) =

(1−ρ)δ
1−(1−ρ)δ
F(30βω¯I)
225β
+ ρ
1−(1−ρ)δ
ωII−δωIII
1−λ if ω¯
I ∈ [0, 1
30β
];
(1−ρ)δ
1−(1−ρ)δ
2
225β
+ ρ
1−(1−ρ)δ
ωII−δωIII
1−λ if ω¯
I > 1
30β
.
(41)
Now let’s compare ωI and ωII
Lemma 5: ωI < ωII . From Lemma 4 and Lemma 6 implies ωI < ωIII
Corollary 3: e¯I < e¯II < e¯III
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Proposition 2: τˆ c1(e) = τˆ c2(e) = τˆ c3(e) = 0 if e ∈ [0, e¯1] and τˆ c1(e) >
τˆ c2(e) > τˆ
c
3(e) if e ∈ (e¯1, 1],
Implications:Comparing phase II and I, we find that even in the absence of
FTAs , the prospects of having FTAs between countries in the future matters as
soon as parallel trade talks are opened between them, the ability of countries to
multilaterally cooperate is enhanced and hence, any trade tension among them
starts to decline. Figure 3 summarizes the most cooperative tariff functions for
all phases.
Figure 3: The most cooperative tariff functions in phase I, phase II and Phase II
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of FTAs on the use of contingent protection
between competing exporters. We consider four-country, four-goods model and
develop a dynamic model similar to the competing-importers one of Tabakis
(2015), where multilateral trade cooperative must be self-enforcing and the eco-
nomic environment is characterized by trade-flow volatility. We model three
distinct but interrelated phases; phase I is the pre negotiations period, phase II
negotiation period and phase III is the period where the world has two symmetric
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FTAs among the four countries. Our analysis demonstrates that the findings of
Tabakis (2015) extend to our competing-exporters case. In particular, the paral-
lel formation of different FTAs results in a gradual but permanent easing of mul-
tilateral trade tensions, especially as far as contingent protection is concerned.
Thus, our results supports the building-block effect of FTAs on multilateral trade
cooperation.
Though our model constitutes an extension of the previous literature, we believe
that our results provide further evidence that the formation of FTAs enhances
multilateral cooperation. In the future, we plan to consider the asymmetric for-
mation of FTAs in order to shed more lights on the question at hand.
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7 Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
Following Similar procedure as in Tabakis(2015), we have the following most
cooperative tariff function.
τˆ cx(e) =
 0 if e ∈ [0, e¯3];2(e−e¯)
21β
if e ∈ (e¯3, 1].
e¯3 =
√
126βω
ω = δ
1−δ
1
1323
[
2
(√
126βω
)3 − 6 (126βω) + 6√126βω]
Define a function :
F (y) = 2y
3
2 − 6y + 6y 12
F ′ (y) = 3 (y)
1
2 − 6 + 3 (y)− 12 = 3
(
y
1
2 + y−
1
2 − 2
)
= 3
(√
y − 1)2√
y
> 0 iff y ̸= 1
F ′′ (y) = 3
1
2
(y)−
1
2 − 31
2
(y)−
3
2 =
3
2
(
y−
1
2 − y− 32
)
=
3
2
(
1√
y
− 1
y
3
2
)
=
3 (x− 1)
2y
3
2
< 0 iff y < 1
ω˜ (ω) =
δ
1− δ
2
(√
126βω
)3 − 6(126)βω + 6√126βω
1323β
=
δ
1− δ
F (126βω)
1323β
ω˜ (0) = δ
1−δ
F (0)
1323β
= 0
ω˜′ (ω) = δ
1−δ
126
1323
F ′ (126βω) > 0 iff 126βω ̸= 1⇒ ω ̸= 1
126β
ω˜′ (0) = δ
1−δ
126
1323
F ′ (0) = δ
1−δ
126
1323
3 (0−1)
2
0
= +∞
ω˜′
(
1
126β
)
= δ
1−δ
126
1323
F ′ (1) = δ
1−δ
126
1323
3 (1−1)
2
1
= 0
ω˜′′1 (ω1) =
δ
1−δ
15876β
1323
F ′′ (126βω) < 0 iff 126βω < 1⇒ ω1 < 1126β
{0 < ωIII < 1
126β
}
Then ,
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=⇒ δ
1−δ
F (1)
1323β
< 1
126β
=⇒ δ < 1323
1575
= 0.84
Proof of Lemma 3
We define a continuous function φ(ω¯II) = ω˜II(ω¯II)− ω¯II
φ(0) = λ
1−(1−λ)δω
III
i > 0 Thus if φ(ωIII) − ωIII < 0 then we must have
φ(ω¯II) = 0, in the interval (0, ωIII) =⇒ ωII < ωIII
Hence,the following should be satisfied
ω˜II(ωIII) < ωIII ⇐⇒ (1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
F(30βωIII)
225β
+ λ
1−(1−λ)δω
III < ωIII
Rearranging :
⇐⇒ (1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
F(30βωIIIi )
225β
< (1−λ)(1−δ)
1−(1−λ)δ ω
III
i
⇐⇒ δ F(30βω
III
i )
225β
< (1− δ)ωIIIi
⇐⇒ F (30βωIII) < (1− δ)ωIII 225β
δ
=⇒ F (30βωIII) < 225βωIIIδ
1−δ
Re-
call from the proof of Lemma 1 F(y) is strictly increasing for all y except y ̸= 1:
Hence,
=⇒ F (30βωIII) < 225βωIIIδ
1−δ
Thus: Since ωIII < 1
126β
< 1
30β
, F is strictly increasing
=⇒ F (126βωIII) > F (30βωIII) < 225βωIIIδ
1−δ
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=⇒ F (126βωIII) > 225βωIIIδ
1−δ
From Lemma 1 we have F
(
126βωIII
)
= 1323βω
III
δ
1−δ
Therefore, 1323βωIIIδ
1−δ
> 225βω
III
δ
1−δ
Proof of Lemma 5:
Using the same techniques as in the proof of Lemma 4, we define a function
pi
(
ω¯I
) ≡ ω˜I(ω¯I)− ω¯I and recalling ωI ∈ (0, 1
30β
) if we evaluate φ(0) = ω˜(0)−
0 =
ρ(ωII −ωIII)
[1−(1−ρ)δ][1−λ] > 0
And ρ(ω
II −ωIII)
[1−(1−ρ)δ][1−λ] =
ρ
[1−(1−ρ)δ][1−λ]
[
(1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)
F(30βωII)
225β
+ λ(δ−λδ)
1−(1−λ)δω
III
]
Therefore if pi(ωII) < ω˜I(ωII) − ωII < 0 =⇒ pi(ω¯I) = 0 at some point
(0, ωI)
Next we will check if pi(ωII) < ω˜I(ωII)− ωII < 0
pi(ωII) < ω˜I(ωII)− ωII < 0 =⇒ ω˜I(ωII) < ωII
=⇒ (1−ρ)δ
1−(1−ρ)δ
F(30βωII)
225β
+ ρ
1−(1−ρ)δ
ωII−λωIII
1−λ < ω
II
⇐⇒ ρ
[1−(1−ρ)δ][1−λ]
[
(1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)
F(30βωII)
225β
+ λ(δ−λδ)
1−(1−λ)δω
III
] [
(1−ρ )δ
1−(1−ρ )δ
F(30β ω II)
225β
]
+
(1−ρ)δ
1−(1−ρ)δ
F(30βωII)
225β
< (1−λ)δ
1−(1−λ)δ
F(30βωII)
225β
+ λ
1−(1−λ)δω
III ⇐⇒
λδ
[1−(1−ρ)δ][1−(1−λ)δ]
[
F(30βωII)
225β
− F(126βω
III)
1323β
]
< 0
Note: The term in the bracket is negative because from Lemma 3, ωII <
ωIII =⇒ F (30βωII) < F (30βωIII) Since, λδ
[1−(1−ρ)δ][1−(1−λ)δ] > 0 ; we need
to show
[
F(30βωII)
225β
− F(126βω
III)
1323β
]
is negative. Divide all terms by δ
1−δ
F(30βωII)
225β
δ
1−δ
− F(126β ω
III)
1323β
δ
1−δ
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From Lemma 1 F
(
126β ω III
)
= 1323βδ
1−δ
=⇒ F(126β ω
III)
1323β
δ
1−δ
= 1
FromLemma 4: F
(
30β ω III
)
< 225βδ
1−δ
andωII < ωIII =⇒ F (30βωII) <
F
(
30β ω III
)
< 225βδ
1−δ
because F is increasing. This implies that F(30β ω
III)
225β
δ
1−δ
< 1
and hence ,
[
F(30βωII)
225β
− F(126βω
III)
1323β
]
is negative.
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